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The banking market (jigsaw) puzzle :
Would coming closer to a stand-alone 
subsidiary model automatically lead
to cross-border re-fragmentation ?
Introduction
Over  the  two  last  decades,  banking  markets  through-
out the world have gone through a period of profound 
changes, marked by the emergence of some large cross-
border  financial  institutions.  This  trend  was  even  more 
important in Europe where it was supported by a strong 
desire to unify fragmented national markets and to rein-
force  the  cohesion  between  European  countries.  The 
integration of financial and banking markets in Europe 
spearheaded  economic  integration,  and  many  believed 
it to be a strong, necessary, and inescapable trend with 
many positive consequences, both for the financial indus-
try, but also, more generally, for European countries and 
eventually  for  European  citizens.  The  perceived  advan-
tages included benefits such as increased market liquidity, 
a reduction in transaction costs, more efficient transfers 
of funds from countries with excess savings to locations in 
needs of capital, accelerated transfer of financial technol-
ogy, or a levelling of the European playing field.
The  integration  of  financial  and  banking  markets  was 
supported, at the highest level, by changes in the legal, 
regulatory and economic environment : the launch of a 
common currency in the euro-zone countries, the intro-
duction of the first and second banking directives – which 
included  important  breakthroughs  such  as  the  single 
banking licence, the home country control principle and 
the mutual recognition principle – and the harmonisation 
of  financial  laws  through  the  Financial  Services  Action 
Plan  (FSAP).  The  ultimate  objective  of  financial  market 
integration was to develop a single market where geo-
graphic location or nationality would become irrelevant in 
financial and banking operations.
However, this objective may not have been fully attained 
and,  as  a  consequence,  market  integration  in  Europe 
might be less deep-seated than initially believed. Financial 
market integration proceeded smoothly in the early years 
of the single market, even though the level of integration 
varied in the different segments of the financial market 
(see e.g. Baele et al., 2004). Yet, following the financial 
crisis, the process might now appear to be reversible. The 
latest studies on financial market integration (ECB, 2009 
and 2010) confirm that integration of financial markets, 
and  in  particular  of  money  markets,  suffered  from  the 
recent crisis. The negative impact might vanish over time, 
as markets normalise, but it nevertheless led to worries 
in  the  financial  industry.  As  a  consequence,  prominent 
bankers  have  recently  expressed  their  concerns  on  re-
fragmentation (see e.g. Ackermann, 2009a and 2009b, 
Banzinger 2009 and IIF 2009a and 2009b).
The risk of cross-border re-fragmentation can be defined 
as  the  risk  of  segmentation,  along  national  lines,  of 
hitherto integrated financial markets or financial institu-
tions, as a side effect of an adaptive process by market 
participants or new regulatory developments. This defi-
nition  contains  two  main  elements.  First,  it  establishes 
a  distinction  between  the  fragmentation  of  financial 
markets and the fragmentation of cross-border financial 
institutions, which are two different concepts. Indeed, as 
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will be argued in this article, the fact that the operations 
of a cross-border bank become somewhat less integrated 
would  not  necessarily  endanger  market  integration. 
Similarly, the fact that a banking group is integrated and 
operates  in  different  jurisdictions  does  not  necessarily 
mean that these jurisdictions form an integrated market. 
For instance, a group may determine its liquidity policy 
at a central level and allow flows between entities oper-
ating  in  different  regions  that  are  not  really  integrated 
(e.g. Europe and Asia). Secondly, the definition identifies 
two different sources of fragmentation risk. It may result 
from  changes  in  financial  institutions’  behaviour :  for 
instance, banks that have incurred major losses following 
their expansion on foreign markets may retreat to their 
home market (see e.g. Hakkarainen, 2009). Alternatively, 
re-fragmentation may also arise from new developments 
in the regulatory environment.
The financial industry has in fact identified various sources 
of re-fragmentation linked to the regulatory framework 
(see IIF, 2009a), which can be broken down into three 
different  categories.  First,  the  financial  industry  argues 
that  national  authorities’  interventions  to  resolve  the 
crisis have planted the seeds of future re-fragmentation. 
Indeed, national authorities have, in some cases, accom-
panied  their  rescue  measures  with  strict  conditions  or 
repeated demands forcing rescued institutions to lend to 
their domestic economy.  (1) Similarly, host authorities may 
have taken measures to protect domestic entities during 
the crisis and ring-fence their assets. Second, according 
to the financial industry, the re-regulation trend follow-
ing the crisis, if uncoordinated, could become a source 
of fragmentation risk. Differences in national regulatory 
frameworks may increase the legal and compliance costs 
associated with international activities, counter-balancing 
all the synergies arising from cross-border integration. Yet, 
although their intensity may vary over time, national dis-
crepancies in regulatory frameworks have always existed 
and have not, in recent years, stopped the globalisation of 
financial markets. In addition, several coordination bodies 
have been set up in the past – including the G20, the 
Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee, and, at the 
European level, the European Institutions – and each of 
them is currently examining, within the limits of its man-
date, how to promote an increased convergence of regu-
latory frameworks. The third source of re-fragmentation 
identified by the financial industry relates to the so-called 
stand-alone subsidiary model. As will be explained in the 
article, the stand-alone subsidiary model refers to a set of 
measures, partly described in section 1, such as e.g. local 
liquidity requirements, or limits on intra-group exposures. 
The designation of the model may, however be mislead-
ing, as in many case, these measures do not aim at impos-
ing  the  corner  situation  in  which  subsidiaries  are  truly 
stand-alone entities. Rather, their objective is to decrease 
risks taken locally and at the same time ensure that crises 
affecting  local  entities  are  manageable  at  a  local  level, 
i.e. where crisis management responsibilities lie.  (2)
Given that the first category of sources of fragmentation 
(i.e. crisis resolution measures) is linked to the crisis and 
is consequently temporary by nature, and given that the 
second category (i.e. non-coordination of measures taken 
by national authorities) is not a new development, the rest 
of the article focuses on the stand-alone subsidiary model. 
These measures are also the most important ones as they 
may reflect a durable change in authorities’ expectations 
and, as a consequence, might imply a paradigm shift in 
the way regulatory frameworks are devised. The objective 
of this article is to examine whether stand-alone measures 
could possibly threaten market integration.
The impact of these expected regulatory changes on inte-
gration in normal times is not necessarily obvious as many 
different dimensions interact. Here again, there is a need 
to  distinguish  between  integration  of  financial  markets 
and  integration  of  financial  institutions.  The  degree  of 
integration of a banking group is not a binary variable ; 
rather, it evolves along a continuum (see also section 1). 
Therefore, measures reducing group interdependence do 
not necessarily imply the “dis-integration” of a group. In 
fact, there may be just a small move along this continuum, 
with no impact on market integration. Actually, financial 
market integration will only be at risk if costs associated 
with these measures are excessively high and if, in addi-
tion, banks cannot reduce the cost associated with these 
measures by adapting their behaviour in a way that satis-
fies supervisors.  (3) The idea behind the model is, however, 
that limited private costs in normal times should be com-
pensated by a decrease in the public costs associated with 
crisis management. Supervisors therefore have to find the 
delicate balance between measures that decrease the risk 
for their local financial system and measures that would 
threaten future integration of banking markets.
(1)  See e.g. the French rescue plan that was accompanied with clear wishes as to the 
financing of households, SMEs and large firms and local authorities  
(see e.g. Intervention du Président de la République, à l’issue du Conseil des 
Ministres, Paris, le 13 octobre 2008). Similarly, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
said, when the second UK rescue plan was launched : “These are comprehensive 
measures focused on one purpose : increasing the amount of lending that is 
available to families and to the businesses who are the backbone of our country 
and who want to invest and create jobs”. (See e.g. “U.K. unveils second bank 
rescue plan”, CNNMoney.com – 19 January 2009).
(2)  This would also imply, as a corollary, that some groups would no longer be too 
big to fail, as each legal entity belonging to a group could be dealt with at a local 
level. Admittedly, however, the failure of some of these entities may still raise 
financial stability concerns.
(3)  For instance, an entity lending funds to its group may be constrained by limits on 
large intra-group exposures. Instead of transferring funds to another entity that 
uses them to finance loans, the entity could directly finance part of these loans. 
As a consequence, the entity’s exposure would become more diversified. This 
would reassure the local supervisor and at the same time render the constraint 
less binding.145
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The  article  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  1  describes 
the stand-alone subsidiary model. Section 2 discusses the 
link between stand-alone measures and the legal form 
of incorporation. In fact, measures imposing stand-alone 
subsidiaries may imply a higher risk of fragmentation if 
cross-border  institutions  are  no  longer  able  to  operate 
as a group. However, a branch structure may constitute 
an  alternative  model  to  preserve  banks’  integration.  It 
is therefore crucial, in this context, to understand what 
drives the choice of a given legal structure. Section 3 tries 
to assess the impact that the generalised use of the stand-
alone  subsidiary  model  would  have,  both  on  financial 
stability and on banking sector efficiency. Section 4 raises 
the issue of the tension between market integration and 
the European framework for crisis management, which 
is still based largely on national powers. It is this tension 
that creates incentives for national authorities to adopt 
measured based on territoriality. Therefore, this tension 
may need to be resolved if the risk of fragmentation is 
considered real and significant. That is why the section 
discusses  elements  of  the  European  framework  that,  if 
addressed, could help to reduce these incentives. Finally, 
section 5 concludes.
1.  The stand-alone subsidiary model
Sub-section  1.1.  clarifies  what  exactly  is  meant  by  the 
stand-alone  subsidiary  model,  while  sub-section  1.2. 
provides examples of rules that come under that model.
1.1  Description
The stand alone-subsidiary model, despite its designation, 
is not really a model. Actually, it refers to a set of rules – 
which do not necessarily need to be introduced simultane-
ously – that share the same objectives, i.e. to facilitate crisis 
resolution by local authorities and make sure that, despite 
the level of integration of a banking group, the survival of 
its local entities does not depend entirely on the strength 
of the group. These measures thus try to ease the tension 
between  the  cross-border  model  of  banks  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  national  allocation  of  crisis  management 
responsibilities on the other (or as Mervyn King said, the 
fact is that “banks are global in life but national in death”).
In order to facilitate crisis management at a local level, 
so-called stand-alone measures seek to work along three 
main lines :
–    First they try to reduce the complexity of large cross-
border  financial  institutions.  This  complexity  results 
from the fact that large banking groups often combine 
different activities with varying risk levels and different 
stakeholders. The interactions between these activities 
and their geographic dispersion make crisis manage-
ment tremendously complicated. In addition, the com-
plexity increases when resources and infrastructure are 
shared by several entities across borders. The set of rules 
laid down to reduce complexity may therefore comprise 
rules to ensure that the subsidiary has the operational 
capabilities, the expertise, the IT systems and the infra-
structure necessary to function autonomously.  (1)
–    Second,  the  stand-alone  measures  try  to  strengthen 
domestic entities both in normal times and in a crisis. 
They may comprise limits on risks taken locally, to make 
sure that the subsidiary’s capital and liquidity are suffi-
cient to sustain its local operations. These measures are 
based on a bottom-up approach, which assumes that 
strengthening each legal entity helps to increase the 
resilience of a group as a whole. In addition, measures 
may include ways to protect the assets of the subsidiary 
in times of crisis (ring-fencing).
–    Third, they attempt to decrease the interdependence 
between an entity and its group. This may imply limiting 
the exposure of an entity towards its group (i.e. flows 
to the group), but also limiting its dependence on the 
group (i.e. flows from the group).
Do  these  measures  reduce  the  integration  of  banking 
groups ?  Actually,  the  level  of  operational  integration 
of a group could be presented along a continuum. For 
instance, some groups already operate with quasi stand-
alone subsidiaries while others are much more integrated. 
Several models exist along this continuum, which can be 
stylised as follows  (2) :
–    a low level of integration where the group entities only 
share best practices in terms of governance and bank-
ing  technology.  The  entities  could  be  disconnected 
with, in most cases, limited difficulties.
–    a  moderate  level  of  integration  where  the  group’s 
entities share infrastructure, such as IT infrastructure, 
or resources, such as legal or human resources depart-
ments. In this case, separating the entities requires the 
negotiation of service level agreements to ensure that 
the provision of the services is not discontinued, at least 
in a transitional phase.
–    a medium level of integration where the brand is also 
shared.  Separation  is  less  easily  arranged  because  it 
requires a rebranding of some of the entities.
–    a  high  level  of  integration  where  in  addition,  key 
functions  such  as  liquidity  and  risk  management  are 
centralised.  In  addition,  internal  markets,  based  on 
(1)  Note that this does not necessarily imply duplication of these functions, as other 
arrangements such as service level agreements can achieve the same objective.
(2)  While the presentation along a continuum may seem to suggest that integration 
is linear, it is not so. Indeed, several elements of a bank’s management could be 
integrated. The stylised models, each of them based on a single dimension, are 
thus presented for illustrative purposes only.146
the assumption that assets are fungible, may help to 
re-allocate resources within the group to the different 
legal entities. In this model, disconnection is complex, 
as individual entities may not be able to operate on a 
stand-alone basis.
As explained below, even though they may imply a move 
along this continuum, depending on the nature of rules 
introduced, supervisory measures imposing a stand-alone 
subsidiary  model  do  not  aim  to  make  it  impossible  to 
adopt one of these models.
1.2  Examples
There are various ways of facilitating crisis management. 
First,  authorities  may  try  to  identify,  in  advance,  issues 
that are likely to complicate crisis management. This is the 
objective of living wills (see also Box 1), in which large and 
complex banks are asked to determine how they could 
easily be dismantled in reaction to a crisis. Reducing the 
complexity of a banking group will often require changes 
in its organisational structure or the introduction of some 
firewalls.
Alternatively, supervisory authorities may also impose gen-
eral limits on local risks and intra-group dependence. Such 
measures may include local liquidity rules, for instance. The 
Consultative Document released by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2009) proposes to intro-
duce two binding liquidity ratios, which would be applied 
on a consolidated basis, though the document does not 
exclude the possibility of their local application to a subset 
of legal entities. The industry, together with some policy 
makers (see e.g. Strauss Kahn, 2010), argues that local 
requirements do induce a risk of fragmentation because 
they create trapped pools of liquidity (i.e. liquidity pools 
that cannot be easily redeployed within the group). This 
would  therefore  hamper  the  central  management  of 
liquidity and would complicate intra-group cross-border 
flows. However, it should also be noted that once local 
requirements are met, liquidity can still flow freely within 
the  group  and  that,  consequently,  these  rules  do  not 
impede the reallocation of excess liquidity within a group.
Another  example  of  a  regulatory  development  whose 
objective  would  be  to  reduce  internal  dependence  is 
linked  to  the  limits  that  supervisory  authorities  may 
want to impose on intra-group exposures. The amended 
Capital  Requirements  Directive  provides  for  revision  of 
the large exposures regime, including large intra-group 
exposures,  where  national  discretion  remains  possible. 
Too strict limits on these exposures may make the real-
location of funds within a group more difficult. Similarly, 
potential capital surcharges for systemic risk, if applied 
to local legal entities rather than on a consolidated basis, 
could also induce an increase in costs that may eventually 
reduce the benefits of cross-border operations (see e.g. 
IMF, 2010). Yet if these measures impose excessive con-
straints on a bank’s cross-border operations, the bank can 
still change its legal form of incorporation from a subsidi-
ary model to a branch model (even though there may be 
some constraints on the legal form – see also   section 2). 
Yet,  such  a  move  by  the  financial  industry  would  also 
imply  a  transfer  of  crisis  management  responsibilities, 
from host authorities to home authorities. In certain cases, 
this transfer may be detrimental for the host country, for 
instance, if the home country has not the capacity to sup-
port the activities of the branch in case of problems (see 
e.g. Icelandic case).
4
Box 1  –    Reducing complexity through recovery and resolution plans  
(living wills)
Several international bodies, including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) and the Financial 
Stability Forum (2009), have recommended improving crisis preparation through the design of ex-ante plans. 
Similarly, in its communication on an EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, 
the European Commission seems to assume that firm-specific contingency and resolution plans constitute one of 
the elements that can contribute to improvements in the framework for early intervention.
As explained by the FSA (2009), recovery and resolution plans are plans produced by financial institutions. They 
comprise two different elements :147
ThE baNkiNg markET (jigSaw) puzzlE
2.  The branch model as an integrated 
alternative for banks
Sub-section  2.1  describes  the  different  legal  forms  that 
banks  could  use.  Sub-section  2.2.  discusses  the  link 
between crisis management and the choice of a particular 
legal structure. It then discusses some additional conditions 
that need to be fulfilled for fragmentation to develop.
2.1  Differences between branches and subsidiaries
The corporate structure determines the extent to which 
operations  are  legally  considered  as  forming  a  single 
entity or separate legal entities. In the EU, two models 
are widely used by banks to give a legal form to their 
foreign activities, namely the subsidiary and the branch.  (1) 
The subsidiary is a separate legal entity with a legal per-
sonality. It is supervised by the member state in which it 
is incorporated and needs to comply with the regulatory 
framework of that country. The subsidiary is, therefore, 
subject  to  potentially  specific  prudential  requirements 
of  that  country,  including  rules  on  capital  and  liquidity 
requirements, if any. In addition, the authorisation of the 
licensing or supervisory authority of the host country is 
necessary before a subsidiary can be set up.
The branch, on the other hand, is not legally distinct from 
its parent company with which it forms a single entity. For 
instance, the branch has no separate balance sheet, and 
the capital held to meet requirements arising from assets 
booked by the branch may be located in the home coun-
try. As a consequence, the home country principle applies 
and the branch is therefore supervised, with the exception 
of liquidity, by the authorities in the home member state. 
Branching within the European Union is facilitated by the   
fact  that  host  authorities,  which  are  notified  prior  to 
the opening of a branch, do not have the right to refuse 
the establishment of the branch if it has been authorised 
by the home authority.  (2)
A distinction needs to be made between the legal struc-
ture and the integration of operations (see section 1.1). 
Indeed, the legal organisation does not necessarily match 
the structure of the business. For instance, even though 
a subsidiary is legally distinct from its parent company, its 
operations may very well be closely integrated into those of 
the group. When the operations of a subsidiary are highly 
integrated in those of the group, for instance because key 
functions  are  managed  centrally,  the  subsidiary,  despite 
being a legally distinct entity, may no longer be viable on 
a stand-alone basis. This structure is called a quasi branch. 
The problem of quasi branches is that they are supervised 
by the host authority, who also manages their crises, even 
though key functions are centralised in the home country, 
i.e. outside the jurisdiction of the host authority.
(1)  Please note that if EU credit institutions duly notify the host authority, their 
single passport also enables them to provide banking services directly in another 
country, without having a permanent presence in that country. 
(2)  For completeness, it should be noted that another legal form of incorporation, 
very similar to a branch structure, was introduced in 2004, but with no 
application in the banking sector so far, namely the European Company Statute 
(Societas Europeae).
–    A recovery plan is a contingency plan drafted by the bank which explains what it intends to do in order to 
respond to and recover from severe stress. The main assumption of the plan is that authorities do not intervene. 
The plan needs to credibly explain how the bank, in a severe stress situation, can restore its liquidity and capital 
position. This may imply restructuring the assets and liabilities of the firm in a drastic way and revising its 
strategy, including through disposals, an increase in capital, the exit from certain activities, the offloading of 
risks, etc.
–    A resolution plan : The resolution plan assumes, on the other hand, that authorities have to intervene to ensure 
an orderly resolution. The resolution plan, since it is drafted by the bank, does not explain how authorities 
should resolve the crisis situation but rather how the firm can contribute to the orderly resolution. The bank 
needs to identify the obstacles to an orderly resolution. For instance, it needs to explain how it intends to 
unplug itself from key systems and major infrastructures. Practical details, such as provision of information   
to authorities, also need to be addressed in the resolution plan.
As  explained  by  Huertas  (2010),  recovery  plans  contribute  towards  decreasing  the  probability  of  failure  of   
a given institution, while resolution plans help to reduce the cost to society should such failure occur. However, 
it is important to note that these plans do not specify a path for crisis resolution, as the choice of the recovery or 
resolution tool depends on the circumstances of the particular crisis.148
2.2  The relationship between crisis management, 
the legal structure and risk of re-fragmentation
Some  banks  tend  to  say  that  the  choice  of  the  legal 
structure, be it a branch, a quasi branch or a stand-alone 
subsidiary,  is  neutral  from  a  financial  stability  point  of 
view. They argue that it will be very difficult for a group 
to let a subsidiary fail without having to face disastrous 
knock-on effects on the rest of the group. Indeed, to pre-
serve its reputation, the bank is obliged to stand behind 
its affiliates, whatever their legal form.  (1) Similarly, market 
participants argue that the legal form is not relevant for 
them because, when a group is in difficulty, access to the 
market is shut for the group as a whole, including all its 
subsidiaries  and  branches.  The  fact  that  creditors,  in  a 
crisis, do not care about the legal substance of the entity 
of the bank they face implies that they do not believe in 
the effectiveness of existing firewalls.
To conclude that the legal structure is not relevant for 
financial stability is, however, incorrect. Indeed, in a crisis 
situation, the legal form, as well as the structure of opera-
tions,  remains  important  for  several  reasons.  First,  the 
legal structure determines the powers of the home and 
host authorities both in normal times and in a crisis. For 
instance, a credit institution and its branches are wound 
up as a single entity, and the procedure is initiated by the 
home country. A subsidiary, on the other hand, is wound 
up by the host authority. The argument that, because of 
the risk to reputation, the probability of default of the 
different entities within a group does not depend on the 
legal form of incorporation may be true. However, in case 
of failure, the loss-given-default of each of these entities 
will be eventually determined by the legal structure of the 
group. In addition, the legal structure also plays a role for 
insured creditors, as the deposit insurance scheme (and 
the  associated  conditions  of  indemnification  –  includ-
ing  legal  time  limits  for  the  reimbursement  of  insured 
deposits)  may  be  different  if  the  bank  is  incorporated 
as a subsidiary or as a branch. Finally, the subsidiary has 
its own supervisory board and board of directors. These 
bodies have to defend the interest of the subsidiary and 
have to oppose any transfer that would be detrimental 
to the subsidiary. All these points demonstrate that the 
decision whether to establish a subsidiary or a branch is 
not neutral.
Even though this choice is not neutral, authorities cannot 
force a bank to choose a particular structure. Indeed, the 
freedom of establishment of a bank headquartered in one 
of the European member states, entitling it to set up an 
establishment in another member state, is guaranteed by 
Article 49 of the Treaty and by Article 23 of the Capital 
Requirements Directive. As a consequence, any restriction 
whereby a host authority would limit the choice of the 
legal structure of foreign establishment would be consid-
ered illegal. However, in order to improve the alignment 
of  supervisory  responsibilities  with  crisis  management 
responsibilities,  and  to  provide  better  protection  for 
domestic depositors, some national authorities may nev-
ertheless contemplate introducing measures that would 
reduce the dependence of subsidiaries upon their parent 
company. In other words, some national authorities may 
evaluate whether a stricter implementation of the stand-
alone subsidiary model and the subsequent weakening 
of the quasi-branch model would be possible in normal 
times and beneficial in times of crisis.
This option, however, can only be considered as a default 
option  that  authorities  may  nevertheless  be  forced  to 
choose if a more integrated regulatory, supervisory and 
crisis management framework cannot be achieved at the 
European level (see also section 4). Determining the extent 
to which the generalised use of the stand-alone model 
could lead to market re-fragmentation is not trivial. Since 
credit institutions can still, in theory, continue to expand 
by establishing branches abroad, i.e. remain integrated, it 
is not clear why cross-border re-fragmentation would nec-
essarily occur. It seems that at least one of two alternative 
conditions needs to be fulfilled for the generalised use of 
the stand-alone subsidiary model to lead to a large-scale 
re-fragmentation of banking markets. First, given that the 
branch model is an integrated alternative to the stand-
alone subsidiary model, there should be some restrictions 
preventing banks from converting their subsidiaries into 
branches. That is not legally possible, but as explained in 
Box 2, this choice may be constrained by other factors. 
Alternatively, banking market re-fragmentation could also 
occur if authorities tried to alter the nature of the branch 
model, imposing some restrictions on branches, in addi-
tion to those applicable to stand-alone subsidiaries, so as 
to make them viable on a stand-alone basis.
(1)  However, there is one exception, namely when a crisis is clearly country-related 
and does not result from mismanagement by the bank. Tschoegl (2005) discusses 
the cases of Crédit Agricole, Scotiabank and MBK Mercobank during the 
Argentinean crisis. In each of these three cases, the foreign parent company 
refused to recapitalise its failed subsidiary located in Argentina, and requested the 
intervention of the Argentinean government. Note that Scotiabank, nevertheless, 
did reimburse 20 p.c. of the value of the marketable security issued by its 
subsidiary, probably in an attempt to salvage its reputation.149
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Box 2  –  Factors driving the choice of the legal structure
In  Europe,  the  Treaty  guarantees  banking  groups  the  freedom  to  choose  their  legal  form  of  incorporation. 
However, as noticed by Dermine (2006) and the ECB (2010), the subsidiary model seems to dominate cross-border 
expansion. The choice of the legal form of incorporation is influenced by a broad range of considerations. Actually, 
given the diversity of these factors, it may be best for a banking group to opt for a branch in some circumstances 
and a subsidiary in others. Most groups therefore usually comprise both branches and subsidiaries. The factors 
influencing the choice of a legal structure include :
–    Historical factors : History plays a major role in the choice of legal structure. There is some inertia in the legal 
structure, as converting a branch into a subsidiary and vice-versa may become difficult once a given size or 
complexity is reached. Therefore, it may be easier and cheaper for banks that have expanded across borders 
through mergers and acquisitions to keep a subsidiary structure.
–    Tax optimisation : Tax optimisation seems to be a major factor influencing the choice of the legal structure (see 
e.g. Cerutti et al., 2007). The tax regime applied to subsidiaries differs from the one applied to branches. Some 
common principles generally apply to the differences in tax treatment of both branches and subsidiaries across 
Europe, even though some may be country-specific. One of these principles is that, in most cases, losses made 
by a branch can be offset immediately against the parent company’s profits (whereas subsidiaries’ losses usually 
cannot). Generally branches are not subject to dividend withholding taxes, as they do not pay any dividend. 
Since they form separate legal entities, subsidiaries can keep their profits in the host country, and they are 
therefore not automatically taxed in the home country. They are taxed in the host country, keeping in mind that, 
if a subsidiary wants to repatriate profits, it can benefit from the advantages offered under the potential double 
taxation relief treaties concluded between the host and the home countries.
    Another example of differences in branches and subsidiaries’ taxation concerns internal transfer pricing. Since a 
branch and its parent company are considered as a single entity, there is no need, for tax purposes, to establish 
internal transfer pricing for transfers of assets (such as liquidity reallocation) or for the provision of shared 
services. As a consequence, payments made by the branch to its foreign parent company are not usually tax 
deductible. The price of internal transfers between different subsidiaries, on the other hand, will affect the 
allocation of profits within the different legal entities of the group and, eventually, the final amount of taxes 
paid in each of the different locations in which the group is present.
–    Business model : The business model, and the overall strategy of the group, may require opting for a certain 
legal structure. For instance, fully decentralised banks usually prefer to operate with subsidiaries, rather than 
with branches. On the other hand, a branch model may be the preferred choice when the group is run in an 
integrated way.
–    Limited liability, ring-fencing and internal firewalls : Banks may prefer to lodge some of their activities (such as 
asset management) in legally independent entities that are shielded from group problems. The legal structure 
acts as an internal firewall so as to ensure that some specific activities are not liable for the other activities of 
the group, as they would be under a branch structure.
–    Preference of the host country authorities : The host authority may in some cases prefer a given form of legal 
incorporation. For instance, the host authority may prefer to see a large retail bank incorporated as a subsidiary, 
in which the local legal entity is subject to minimum capital and liquidity buffer requirements. In such cases, even 
if the host authority has neither the formal power to impose a certain legal structure, nor the legal authority to 
do so, it may indicate its preference to the bank, which may then decide to follow the opinion of the supervisor.150
3.  Would coming closer to the stand-
alone subsidiary model be safer and 
more efficient than keeping a quasi 
branch model ?
The objective of this section is first to assess the extent to 
which coming closer to the stand-alone subsidiary model 
would be beneficial from a financial stability point of view 
(sub-section 3.1) and, second, to evaluate the impact of 
such modifications on the efficiency of the banking indus-
try (sub-section 3.2).
3.1  Impact on systemic risk
The adoption of measures implementing the stand-alone 
subsidiary model would have an impact on systemic risk 
on both a local and a global scale. In this section, we 
evaluate the impact of the stand-alone subsidiary model 
on banks that would previously have been organised with 
quasi  branches.  We  assume  that  they  keep  their  legal 
structure unchanged and do not opt for a pure branch 
model.
Authorities  that  choose  to  implement  the  stand-alone 
subsidiary model do so to decrease risks at the local level. 
However, the global systemic risk is not the sum of local 
risks, so that it is not obvious that the stand-alone subsidi-
ary model would also lead to a decrease in global systemic 
risk. Actually, the examination of the impact of these rules 
on  systemic  risk  –  in  terms  of  prudential  control,  crisis 
resolution, contagion and risk management (and in par-
ticular liquidity risk management) – may lead to a mixed 
assessment,  with  undisputed  positive  consequences  at 
national level, but also some potentially negative unin-
tended side-effects.
For example, in terms of supervision, national authorities 
may be better able to supervise stand-alone entities estab-
lished in their jurisdiction. Indeed, since these entities do 
not depend on their parent company, local supervisors do 
not need to rely on the supervision of the parent company 
by the home supervisor. On the other hand, the home 
supervisor  may  find  it  more  complicated  to  supervise 
large, complex financial institutions in fragmented mar-
kets, and may encounter significant difficulties in forming 
an integrated view of the risk taken by the entire group. 
For instance, it may be especially difficult to evaluate and 
recognise  cross-border  diversification  gains  in  a  group 
composed of stand-alone subsidiaries.
The  resolution  of  a  crisis  affecting  a  group  composed 
of a constellation of stand-alone subsidiaries may, to a 
certain extent, be easier. First, it clarifies the respective 
–    Features and costs of deposit guarantee schemes : The deposit guarantee scheme that will have to intervene in 
case of failure, and to which the bank will have to contribute if funded ex ante, is determined by the form of 
incorporation. The home country is normally responsible for deposit insurance coverage of branches. A foreign 
branch may, nevertheless, purchase top-up deposit insurance coverage when the coverage offered in the host 
country exceeds that in the home country. As far as subsidiaries are concerned, it is the host country that is 
responsible for deposit insurance coverage. Moving from a subsidiary model to a branch model would imply a 
change of deposit insurance scheme. This may have an impact on the bank if the terms and conditions of home 
and host deposit guarantee schemes differ, or if the initial scheme to which the bank contributed was financed 
ex ante. Indeed, in the latter case the bank may lose the capital already accumulated in the scheme. In addition, 
as argued by Calzolari and Loranth (2010), the choice of legal form – given that it influences the loss distribution 
between the different deposit guarantee schemes – may also indirectly influence the incentives of supervisory 
authorities to control the firm, as well as their potential resolution strategy. These differences are taken into 
account by banks when they have to choose their preferred form of cross-border expansion.
–    Risk  understanding :  A  branch  model  (compared  to  a  stand-alone  subsidiary  model),  may  allow  a  better 
understanding of the risks taken at the group level, by the group board and management. On the other hand 
operating with stand-alone subsidiaries may make it easier to manage ‘soft’ information locally.
–    Option to sell the legal entity : A subsidiary may be easier to sell than a branch as it is more easily removed from 
the group. Therefore, if a bank wants to keep open the option of selling some of its activities, it may prefer to 
adopt a subsidiary model.151
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responsibilities  of  home  and  host  authorities,  since  co-
operation between national authorities is not necessarily 
required  to  solve  the  crisis.  Each  national  authority  is 
therefore strictly responsible for the entities located in its 
jurisdiction. Authorities are able to fall back on legal enti-
ties that are, or at least may be, viable on a stand-alone or 
national basis. In addition, it permits better tailoring of the 
approach to crisis resolution, even in a non-cooperative 
framework, as it does not require rescuing the whole of a 
large cross-border banking group if that is not necessary. 
Indeed, in such a model, it is probably much easier to 
make a distinction between systemic entities that need to 
be rescued and the rest of the group.
National entities may also benefit from being self-suffi-
cient if that limits the potential for intra-group contagion 
due to reputation risk. One condition that needs to be 
fulfilled to reduce the potential for intra-group contagion 
is that the market must be perfectly informed about the 
group structure and convinced that the various firewalls 
put in place to protect the subsidiary will be effective. If 
wholesale lenders have the slightest doubt about these 
firewalls, they may no longer be effective and, as a con-
sequence, reputation risk would continue to be a major 
source of contagion.  (1)
Even though the model may potentially have a positive 
effect on local entities in terms of decreased intra-group 
contagion, it may also, to some extent, affect their capac-
ity to manage risk as a group. First, depending on the 
nature  of  the  stand-alone  measures  taken,  the  parent 
bank may experience more difficulties in implementing a 
risk management system at the group level, as a conse-
quence of the fragmentation of risk management systems 
within the group. Second, the stand-alone model might 
have an impact not only on risk measurement, but also on 
the capacity to address certain types of risk at the group 
level, and in particular the liquidity risk.
Indeed, some banks use internal markets for liquidity, in 
which liquidity management is centralised, as insurance 
against  liquidity  shocks.  (2)  Liquidity  shocks  arise  from 
the fact that banks need to pay out cash to customers 
on  demand.  Where  actual  liquidity  needs  deviate  from 
banks’ expectations, that implies that some entities within 
a  group  may,  ex-post,  hold  excess  liquidity  or  need  to 
obtain liquidity. Internal markets for liquidity and capital 
are then used within a group for risk sharing purposes, i.e. 
to manage local entities’ idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (see 
also Box 2 for evidence on Belgium).  (3)
The  stand-alone  subsidiary  model  may  impose  some 
constraints on internal markets for liquidity. If these con-
straints are too severe, they may hinder a group’s ability 
to  marshal  resources  within  the  group.  However,  even 
though internal markets for liquidity might be constrained 
by new regulatory developments it should be noted that 
liquidity can still be redistributed externally, through inter-
bank  markets.  Yet  while  internal  capital  markets  have, 
essentially, a cross-border dimension, this may be less the 
case for interbank markets. Indeed, a large proportion of 
interbank transactions in the EU (approximately 70 p.c. – 
according to the ECB, 2009) are currently effected nation-
ally (i.e. between 2 banks coming from the same country). 
In mid-June 2008, cross-border interbank deposits repre-
sented slightly more than 30 p.c. of interbank deposits, 
and the percentage of interbank cross-border loans was 
broadly  similar.  (4)  Consequently,  since  the  cross-border 
dimension is much more present in internal markets, it 
could be that interbank markets, in their present form, 
may  be  unable  to  perform  perfectly  the  role  currently 
played  by  internal  markets  in  insuring  against  regional 
liquidity shocks.
Besides, an externalisation of internal capital markets may 
have some additional consequences. These consequences 
will differ according to whether an entity is a net lender 
or a net borrower in the group. If they want to preserve 
their franchise, net borrowers will have to attract funds 
on external markets to replace funds previously obtained 
from the group. However, compared to internal markets, 
which  are  centrally  managed,  external  markets  may 
suffer  from  asymmetric  information.  The  informational 
advantage which a group enjoys, enabling it to reallocate 
liquidity in the best possible way, is lost when transactions 
are  executed  with  an  external  counterpart.  Given  this 
asymmetry of information, there is a risk that, as we saw 
during the crisis, if counterparts become excessively risk 
averse, the interbank market freezes and no longer plays 
its role in liquidity reallocation. Internal markets, because 
they are not subject to this information gap, would most 
likely continue to function in identical circumstances.
In addition, a net borrowing entity may face a higher cost 
of funding on external markets, not only because of infor-
mation asymmetry, but for at least two additional reasons. 
(1)  Note that creditors convinced of the efficiency of internal firewalls may 
nevertheless also decide to run if they fear that other creditors are likely to run 
because they have reservations about these firewalls. 
(2)  Liquidity centralisation is, however, not a “universal model”, as some large cross-
border banks already prefer to operate with a decentralised structure. The extent 
to which centralisation is the preferred option depends on a range of factors 
including currency convertibility, the bank’s business model, history, size, funding 
model, cost to transfer funds, available infrastructure, etc. (see also BCBS, 2006)
(3)  In addition, thanks to their cross-border dimension, internal markets may also 
help banks to cope with regional crises. de Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) find 
evidence of the existence of cross-border internal capital markets. They argue that 
local subsidiaries, because they profit from parental support, do expand faster 
and, compared to domestic banks, do not restrain their credit supply when facing 
a local financial crisis.
(4)  Previous studies (see e.g. Manna 2004) have shown that this percentage varies 
significantly across countries. Interbank markets are still largely national in large 
countries and more open in smaller countries.152
First, if subsidiaries have to become truly self-sufficient and 
independent  from  their  parent  company,  group  support 
(and also state support when the group is considered to 
be too big to fail) may be less likely. As a consequence, 
their  support  rating  may  decrease,  with  an  immediate 
impact on the cost of funds.  (1) Second, in the past, inter-
nal  markets  may  have  failed  to  correctly  price  liquidity. 
Cross-subsidisation  between  activities  may  have  helped 
to develop parts of financial groups that would not have 
been sustainable otherwise, but this may also have led to 
excessive liquidity risk taking. So, on the one hand, a higher 
cost of funding may affect the capacity of some entities to 
generate profits, and may threaten their business model. 
However, on the other hand, given the more realistic pric-
ing  structure  of  external  markets,  the  externalisation  of 
funding may also lead to more effective discipline.
The effect on entities that were previously net lenders on 
internal markets may be different. In this case, the intra-
group exposure is replaced by an external risk. The pre-
sumably lower concentration of counterparty risk – in an 
internal model, risks are very much concentrated on other 
group entities – should be beneficial, but may also creates 
new channels for contagion or additional exposures.
Stand-alone measures, if not correctly devised, may, there-
fore lead to a paradoxical result in which each national 
entity is individually more robust but, at the same time, 
group risk diversification becomes less effective since the 
group as a whole no longer acts as a source of strength.
4
(1)  This will also allow to determine the extent to which these measure are credible 
for markets.
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(1)  2006 Data
Box 3  –    Do Belgian banks operate internal markets ?  
Evidence from intra-group flows
The gross households saving rate in Belgium, as in some other countries, is relatively high (see e.g. Chart 1). In a 
bank intermediated system, these savings often constitute a significant source of liquidity for banks. Belgian banks, 
which benefit from substantial sources of retail funding, recycle them either to finance activities in Belgium, or to 
fund assets originated in Belgium or in foreign countries, or – as Belgium is a small open economy – to support 153
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3.2  Impact on efficiency
The generalised use of the stand-alone subsidiary model 
could potentially have an impact on the efficiency of the 
banking industry, and compromise the extent to which 
cross-border banks could reap efficiency gains resulting 
from economies of scale  (1) and scope (see, a contrario, an 
(1)  Please note that most empirical studies nevertheless fail to find significant 
evidence of scale economies in banks. This may be due to the absence of 
economies of scale or to measurement errors. 
(1)  Foreign subsidiaries of Belgian banks are thus not consolidated in these figures. The figures are reported by the Belgian entity and concern entities located in 
Belgium.
example of the impact of a de-fragmentation of markets 
on banks’ efficiency in Box 3). Indeed, there is the risk that 
a strict and comprehensive application of the stand-alone 
subsidiary  model  throughout  Europe  may  lead  to  the 
foreign activities. As a consequence, the international recycling of these funds often takes the form of cross-border 
interbank exposures when funds are lent to another bank in a foreign country, or of intra-group cross-border 
exposures when they benefit an affiliated company within the group.
Two different models coexist in Belgium to recycle savings within a group across borders :
–    Liquidity can be recycled via a parent company incorporated in Belgium : Belgium is the home country of some 
large groups that have expanded across borders. The generally cash rich headquarters may recycle part of the 
excess savings raised in Belgium to finance their foreign subsidiaries.
–    Liquidity can be recycled via Belgian subsidiaries of foreign banks : some foreign groups benefit from excess 
savings that were originally raised by their Belgian subsidiaries. The transfers of these excess funds, from the 
subsidiary to the parent company, may create significant intra-group exposures.
Table 1 summarises data relating to the 7 largest Belgian banks (it includes both Belgian groups and Belgian 
subsidiaries  of  foreign  groups).  These  statistics  are  calculated  with  figures  reported  on  a  territorial  basis.  (1)
 
They confirm that customer deposits constitute an important source of funding for Belgian banks, as retail deposits 
represent on average a little bit less than two-thirds of their liabilities. Interbank loans and interbank deposits are 
fairly similar in terms of their (weighted) average level. Yet, interbank loans in large banks located in Belgium 
are mostly granted to foreign counterparts, while interbank deposits are more domestic in nature (not shown in 
the table). In addition, their composition may be different. Indeed, on a territorial basis, we observe that intra-
group loans constitute a large part of the total interbank loans (more than half of interbank loans are granted to 
affiliated companies). On the other hand, deposits from related institutions represent less than one quarter of their 
interbank deposits. This seems to confirm that Belgian banks contribute towards financing their foreign affiliates.
Descriptive statistics on 7 large Belgian Banks










Cross-border intra-group loans as a p.c. of  
total interbank loans  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 97.4 46.2 50.2
Interbank loans as a p.c. of total assets   . . . . . . . . 12.3 97.7 36.8 28.1
Cross-border intra-group deposits as a p.c. of  
total interbank deposits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 63.4 23.6 23.7
Interbank deposits as a p.c. of total liabilities  . . . 6.3 39.1 22.3 28.6
Customer deposits as a p.c. of total liabilities   . . . 46.9 90.3 63.3 51.6
Source : NBB.
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development of small entities, focused essentially on their 
domestic market, that would no longer be able to com-
pete with larger banks, e.g. because they do not reach 
the necessary size to be competitive on global markets.  (1)
For  instance,  in  fragmented  markets,  banks  operating 
internal liquidity markets and centralising liquidity man-
agement may see a decline in the efficiency gains aris-
ing from liquidity centralisation. The stand-alone model 
would  entail  decentralising  treasury  management  and 
establishing local desks. That may increase the costs of 
local operations, as it would imply global increases in staff 
hired to manage liquidity and the establishment of fund-
ing programmes covering all major markets and instru-
ments at a local level. This would also necessitate estab-
lishing new local credit lines with financial counterparts 
and investors, to replace the single credit line with the 
parent company prevailing in a centralised model. In addi-
tion, the capacity to reach a benchmark size in different 
markets could be severely impaired. However, the adop-
tion of a decentralised model is not, per se, inefficient, as 
several banks do currently operate with a decentralised 
structure. This form of organisation may, however, prove 
to be more disadvantageous for certain types of banks.
Secondly,  fragmented  markets  may  also  result  in  the 
constitution of excess capital. Banks target a certain level 
of  economic  capital  that,  given  their  risk  appetite,  will 
be necessary to cover the risks they take. This level of 
economic  capital  may  exceed  the  level  of  their  regula-
tory  capital  requirements,  in  which  case,  the  latter  are 
said  to  be  non-binding.  (2)  The  stand-alone  subsidiary 
model, depending on the extent to which it recognises 
cross-border  diversification  effects,  may  lead  to  higher 
individual  capital  requirements,  and  the  sum  of  these 
individual  capital  requirements  may  exceed  the  desired 
level of economic capital. In addition, the private sector 
has argued that specific national or regional regulatory 
requirements  may  result  in  excess  capital  and  limit  the 
efficient hedging of risks.
Finally, the development of financial infrastructures may 
also  crucially  depend  on  cross-border  scale  economies. 
However, fragmented markets limit the extent to which 
these economies of scale can be exploited across borders, 
implying potentially higher costs for the development of 
cross-border infrastructures.
4
(1)  An additional problem may be that, all other things being equal, a locally active 
stand-alone bank focusing on a large domestic market will be larger than a 
stand-alone bank centred on a small economy. This might introduce a distortion 
in the level playing field, especially between banks active in large and small 
economies. Indeed, imagine that a large bank finances two foreign subsidiaries, 
one located in a large country and another in a small economy, each enjoying 
a market share of 10 p.c. of their local market. If these two entities have to 
become viable on a stand-alone basis, they will have to replace funding from the 
parent by external funding. The entity located in the small economy may find it 
harder to compete with larger banks on wholesale markets because it does not 
reach the benchmark size necessary to raise funds on a wholesale market. The 
subsidiary located in the large country, because it is larger, may not suffer from 
the same problem.
(2)  Note, however, that although the imposition of regulatory capital requirements 
sets a minimum level of capital for all banks, observation of a capital buffer does 
not necessarily imply that these regulatory requirements are not binding. Even in 
the presence of binding capital requirements, banks may hold capital buffers for 
several reasons (see e.g. Milne and Whalley, 2001 or Peura and Keppo, 2006). 
(1)  See e.g. Kane (1996) for an overview of interstate branching restrictions in the U.S over time.
(2)  Note that some restrictions had already been removed before many states adopted the Riegle-Neal Act which relaxed branching restrictions between 1988 and 1993. 
These reforms at state level, however, were not entirely successful in promoting interstate expansion, as it appeared that only a few banks used them to enter new 
states, and those that did so, expanded locally, entering geographically close markets rather than distant ones (see e.g. McLaughlin, 1995).
Box 4  –    Case study : the impact of deregulation of interstate branching 
restriction in the U.S. banking system
Interstate banking and branching restrictions in the U.S. constitute a good example of legal restrictions that 
impose a cross-border fragmentation of banking markets. These restrictions, that have their origins in the National 
Bank Act of 1864 and the McFadden Act of 1927,  (1) as well as in individual state laws, were initially conceived 
in an environment in which long distance communications were difficult. As a consequence, potential synergies 
arising from interstate banking were, at that time, rather limited, while the supervision of banks operating across 
several states would have been more difficult. These restrictions were also justified by a desire to avoid the failure 
of a large bank made up of a significant number of branches (see e.g. Sprague 1903).
Interstate branching restrictions were, however, only lifted in 1994,  (2) through the enactment of the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. The cross-border de-fragmentation of the U.S. banking system 
had an impact not only on the financial industry, but also on the real economy, in various ways.155
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(1)  Not all efficiency gains realised after 1994 can be attributed to the Riegle-Niel Act. According to Nippani and Green (2002), even though banks’ profitability and 
efficiency increased after the Act was passed, most of these changes can be explained by other macro-economic factors. Zou et al. (2007), on the other hand, 
recognise the impact of macro-economic factors, but still find that the deregulation process also played a significant role in improved performance.
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a)	impact	on	the	banking	landscape
First, as Johnson and Rice (2007) notice, banks took full advantage of this wave of deregulation. In 1994, the 
U.S. had 62 out-of-state branches, while in 2004 there were more than 24,000. This number was achieved 
by the consolidation of subsidiaries into branches and by the creation of more than 6,000 new out-of-state 
branches (i.e. approximately 40 p.c. of the total branches created in the same period). This also contributed to the 
development of “mega banks”. DePrince (2005) estimated that the assets of these mega banks grew, on average, 
from $ 111 billion in 1993 to $ 294 billion in 2003. Admittedly, the growth of these mega banks has been driven 
by a large number of factors and is, of course, not entirely attributable to the deregulation of interstate branching, 
especially as a similar movement was also observable in other parts of the world, but the maintenance of these 
restrictions after 1994 would have constrained the growth of these banks and would probably have hampered this 
trend. In that sense this Act may have been a necessary condition to support the growth of these banks.
In parallel with the development of mega banks, the market share of small banks decreased. This resulted in an 
increase in concentration at the national level. According to DePrince (2005), the top five banks accounted for 
20 p.c. of total assets in 1993 against 35 p.c. in 2003. Interestingly enough, Strahan (2002), does not notice any 
increase in local market concentration. He explains this by the fact that interstate branching restrictions did not 
affect the number of banks operating on intrastate local markets. Therefore, once restrictions were removed, 
banks expanded through mergers and acquisitions, creating larger banks at the national level, but without any 
impact on the number of banks operating locally.
b)	impact	on	efficiency	and	profitability
The total wealth effect associated with the passage of the Riegle-Niel Act was estimated by Brook et al. (1998) 
at around $ 85 billion. In order to arrive at this assessment, they use a sample of publicly traded banks for which 
they measure stock returns during the passage of the legislation. They find large abnormal positive gains that were 
partly attributable to take-over discipline, as these positive stock returns were bigger for poorly performing banks 
or banks with low insider ownership. These stock movements were also probably driven by expectations with 
regards to increases in profitability and efficiency. According to Jayaratne and Strahan (1998), the banking industry 
became significantly more efficient after the removal of interstate branching restrictions.  (1) This increased efficiency 
may result from decreases in overhead costs, increased ability to diversify risks geographically, or from the fact that 
banks were able to operate on a larger scale. This increased efficiency, may also have resulted from a reshuffling 
of assets towards more competitive banks, which were suddenly granted the opportunity to acquire market shares 
in less efficient states. Indeed, Strahan (2002) finds a positive correlation between profit rate and asset growth 
after restrictions were lifted, but this correlation was non-existent when interstate branching was still prohibited.
The impact on profitability is, however, not homogeneous. Nippani and Washer (2005) find that small banks and 
large banks saw their returns on assets start to diverge after 1994. While before 1994, small and large banks 
showed similar rates of return on their assets, with small banks sometimes outperforming large banks, this was 
no longer the case after 1994, a period in which the rate of return on assets of small banks became significantly 
lower than the rate achieved by large banks.
c)	real	impact
Finally, these changes may also have had a real impact. Strahan (2002) finds acceleration in economic growth 
of individual states (by about 0.56 percentage points), following the branching deregulation. He explains this 
partly by the fact that access to financing was made easier for new businesses. In addition, the stability of 156
4.  Tension between integration of 
financial markets and national crisis 
management responsibilities : how 
to reduce authorities’ incentives 
to adopt stand-alone subsidiary 
measures ?
National  authorities’  incentives  to  adopt  a  stand-alone 
subsidiary  regime  result  from  a  tension  between,  on 
the  one  hand,  the  cross-border  nature  of  large  finan-
cial institutions and the integration of financial markets 
and, on the other hand, the regulatory and supervisory 
framework, together with crisis management responsibili-
ties which are still mainly national. This tension may be 
sustainable in a transitional phase, but is probably insup-
portable in the long run. A political choice may need to be 
made to reconcile the geographical scope of the financial 
industry with the geographical scope of the prudential 
control framework.
In  the  absence  of  supranational  coordination,  national 
authorities  can  only  resolve  this  tension  by  imposing 
safeguards  on  the  cross-border  expansion  of  financial 
groups, e.g. through measures to ensure that subsidiaries 
established in their jurisdiction are viable on a stand-alone 
basis. This would be a second-best solution. Depending 
on  the  nature  of  the  measures  taken,  the  costs  could 
remain  limited  or  avoided,  in  a  dynamic  approach, 
through limited changes in banks’ behaviour. However, 
if measures are more radical, they could become more 
expensive for the financial sector and potentially lead to a 
re-fragmentation of financial markets.
Alternatively, if authorities want to avoid the threat of 
a re-fragmentation of European financial markets, they 
may have to consider the adoption of a more European 
approach, which may appear to be very demanding and 
difficult. Fonteyne et al. (2010) present a comprehensive 
framework  for  more  European  integration,  comprising 
the development of a European Resolution Authority, a 
pre-funded European Deposit Insurance and Resolution 
Fund, and a specific bankruptcy regime for cross-border 
banks  (28th  regime).  This  framework  is  consistent  but 
probably more realistic only in the long term, and this 
comprehensive approach may not need to be fully imple-
mented to avoid the risk of re-fragmentation. In the short 
term, to avoid the risk of re-fragmentation, authorities 
in Europe should concentrate on four very challenging 
dimensions.
The  first  one  relates  to  the  consistent  application  of 
the regulatory framework, in order to avoid regulatory 
cross-border arbitrage. This not only helps to minimise 
distortions in the level playing field, but is also a prere- 
quisite  for  further  development  of  market  integration. 
The development of a single rule book, with clear limits 
on national options, would constitute an essential tool 
contributing  to  the  harmonisation  of  the  regulatory 
framework.  European  authorities  have  already  agreed 
on the need to develop such a rule book, and this task 
will  be  entrusted  to  the  newly  established  European 
Supervisory Authorities.
Second,  the  supervisory  framework  may  need  to  be 
adapted to take account of the cross-border nature of 
financial institutions. Prudential supervision is still mainly 
national. Efforts have been undertaken to give a more 
European reach to prudential supervision, with the forth-
coming  creation  of  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board 
(ESRB) and the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA). 
The  ESRB  will  be  responsible  for  the  macro-prudential 
oversight of the European financial system. It will have 
to  detect  sources  of  systemic  risk  and  contribute  to 
their  prevention.  Besides  the  ESRB,  three  new  ESAs 
will  be  created,  namely  a  European  Banking  Authority, 
a  European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority  and  a 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. 
The objective of these three authorities will be to enhance 
macro-economic indicators improved as local economies were found to become less sensitive to the performance 
of their banking system. The fact that banks were able to smooth capital shocks over several entities located in 
different states after the reform, thanks to internal cross-border capital markets, seems to have been a significant 
factor contributing to macro-economic stability.
However, these studies reflect a pre-crisis positive view on the benefits of restriction lifting, and are currently being 
questioned and criticised as they may excessively disregard the public benefits of restrictions. For instance, Haldane 
(2010) argues that the efficiency gains may have been realised at the expense of increased systemic risks and the 
resurgence of the too-big-to-fail problem.157
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the  quality  and  the  consistency  of  national  supervisory 
practices,  to  ensure  that  cross-border  financial  groups 
are  adequately  supervised,  and  to  develop  a  European 
single rule book. A co-operative solution of that kind will 
probably be sufficient at this stage if other features of the 
framework,  including  crisis  management,  are  correctly 
addressed.
Third, as long as crisis management remains a domestic 
responsibility, authorities will have incentives to ring-fence 
assets in order to protect domestic depositors and domes-
tic  taxpayers.  Authorities’  expectations  regarding  crisis 
management will, of course, influence how they behave 
in normal times, what they will tolerate and what they 
will not. Solving potential conflicts of interests between 
national authorities in times of crisis does not necessar-
ily  require  setting  up  a  European  agency  in  charge  of 
crisis  management  (resolution  authority)  and  creating 
a European taxpayer (resolution fund), even if this may 
be desirable for other reasons. However, if they are not 
created, they need at least to be replaced by intermedi-
ate  solutions,  involving  e.g.  credible,  fair,  and  binding 
burden sharing that would contribute to the alignment of 
interests. These intermediate solutions may also be very 
difficult to find.
Finally, gaps in the European Union’s insolvency law may 
need to be addressed. For instance, the group concept is 
not recognised in insolvency law. When a group is bank-
rupted, each of its subsidiaries is subject to a separate 
insolvency proceeding. The group cannot be restructured 
as a group since transfers of assets, collateral, liquidity 
or  capital  between  multiple  group  entities  cannot  be 
enforced. Recognising the group dimension is, however, 
extremely challenging from the legal angle, but may be 
necessary to avoid falling back on national legal entities 
in a crisis.
The  European  authorities  have  started  to  work  on  all 
these  different  dimensions.  For  instance,  the  European 
Commission communication (see European Commission, 
2009), raises these various issues. Addressing them would 
make a significant contribution towards reinforcing the 
crisis management framework in a way that could reduce 
the incentives for authorities to resort to stand-alone sub-
sidiary measures.
Concluding remarks
Because they have to bear the cost associated with the 
management and resolution of a banking crisis, national 
authorities  in  Europe  naturally  have  incentives  to  ring-
fence the assets of banks established in their own country. 
Some years ago, this behaviour was expected to materi-
alise only in a crisis situation (see e.g. Nguyen and Praet, 
2006). Since the crisis, authorities have realised that they 
may  also  need  to  protect  domestic  interests  in  normal 
times, e.g. through stand-alone measures.
National  authorities’  incentives  to  adopt  a  stand-alone 
subsidiary  regime  result  from  the  tension  between  the 
cross-border dimension of large financial institutions and 
the domestic nature of crisis management responsibilities. 
One way to resolve this tension is to further strengthen 
the European framework for bank supervision and crisis 
management. However, achieving the necessary changes 
will be extremely challenging.
Yet  in  the  absence  of  substantial  improvements  in  the 
European framework, national authorities may not have 
any other way of resolving this tension, except by impos-
ing limits on the cross-border expansion of banks. The 
financial sector has expressed its concerns about the risk 
of  cross-border  re-fragmentation  of  banking  markets 
that this model could imply. However, it is not obvious 
that this model would automatically lead to large-scale 
re-fragmentation. First, a distinction needs to be made 
between  the  integration  of  financial  institutions  and 
the re-fragmentation of financial markets. The fact that 
financial  institutions  would  be  slightly  less  integrated 
would not necessarily put European integration at risk. 
Second, the cost of these measures may eventually remain 
limited. In addition, in many instances, banks can adapt 
their behaviour and operations in ways that simultane-
ously limit the cost associated with these measures and 
satisfy the supervisor. Finally, banks still have the option 
of  operating  via  branches.  Re-fragmentation  will  only 
happen if banks face additional restrictions on the choice 
of their legal structure or if branches have to become self-
sufficient themselves.
Yet, introducing stand-alone measures remains a subtle 
exercise, that requires authorities currently contemplating 
the adoption of such measures to consult all stakeholders 
to find the delicate balance between, on the one hand, 
measures  that  would  contribute  towards  strengthening 
the national financial sector and limiting the cost of crisis 
management to the domestic taxpayer, and, on the other 
hand, measures that would impose excessive constraints 
on the financial industry and limit the benefits of market 
integration.158
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